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What will happen to race equality policy in the Brexit 
archipelago? Multi-Level Governance, ‘sunk costs’ and the 
‘mischief of faction’ 
 
Abstract 
 
This article considers how one of the ‘archipelago of contradictions’ raised by Brexit 
is the prospect of unconventional policy change, in so far as it includes – amongst 
other options - ‘returning’ to prior conventions that were scaled up from the UK to 
the EU, and then returned to the UK through EU directives. To explore this, the 
paper divides UK equality legislation into three types: (a) that which was created in 
the UK, (b) that which flows from membership of the European Union and (c) that 
which reflects an outgrowth of the two. The translation of this into social policy has 
typically taken a patchwork approach, including a discursive public function which 
addresses the rights of distinct groups as well as their modes of interaction. The 
scope and scale of existing equality approaches have therefore become central to the 
kinds of social and political citizenship achieved by Black and Minority Ethnic 
(BAME) Britons.  While the dangers of Brexit rhetoric are apparent to see, we do not 
yet know how withdrawal from the EU revises (a), (b) or (c).  The article makes a 
tentative attempt to shed light on these entanglements by focusing on public policies 
enacted to pursue race equality in particular.   
 
Keywords: Brexit - Social Policy Change - UK – EU - Race Equality 
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Introduction 
 
Reflecting critically on the scope and reach of Britain’s Parliament, the eighteenth 
century libertarian Jean-Louis de Lolme complained that ‘Parliament can do 
everything but make a woman a man and a man a woman’ (1911[1775]: 970).  With 
both surgical and non-surgical gender reassignments now protected in the Equalities 
Act 2010, were he alive today de Lolme may have cause to revise his view. From the 
perspective of contemporary policy making this anecdote is illustrative; most 
obviously because it highlights how equality agendas have evolved and transformed 
notions of elementary rights (EHRC, 2016; Calder and Cowan, 2013). Perhaps more 
obviously pertinent for this article, and during a period in which UK equality policy 
has been informed by a series of European Union directives (especially those flowing 
from the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1999), the anecdote invites us to register the 
multiple-levels beyond Parliamentary sovereignty through which this has come to 
pass. 
 
Interesting in and of its own right, this is an especially urgent task in the era of 
Brexit. If we are to grasp the implications of the referendum outcome for UK equality 
policies, the article argues that we shall need to track what we might call 
unconventional policy change. It is unconventional in so far as some UK equality 
frameworks had been ‘uploaded’ to the EU level before being returned to the UK 
through EU directives to all member states. This also provided a catalyst for other 
changes to UK approaches. The main question this raises, where does withdrawing 
from the European Union leave us, might be broken down into the following three: 
(1) what are the conceptual approaches best suited to a policy analysis of this topic, 
specifically: which analytical tools might yield the most insights?  (2) Does Brexit 
mean that the UK will ‘return’ to prior conventions that were scaled up from the UK 
to the EC?  (3) Given that these conventions in turn have revised UK approaches, can 
EU approaches be unstitched from UK approaches without altering what has been 
established in both?  
 
The article will take up these general questions with the particular example of Race 
Equality; something that has a distinctive UK policy character that is traceable across 
multiple levels.  This is grounded in an approach through which post-war migrants 
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who arrived as Citizens of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth (CUKC), and 
subsequent British-born generations, have been recognised as ethnic and racial 
minorities requiring state support to overcome distinctive barriers in their exercise of 
citizenship. While not unproblematic, it is a markedly different method then to that 
of European neighbours with comparable colonial histories. For example, France 
pursued a robustly assimilationist strategy in which equality was understood as 
uniformity, and until the beginning of this millennium Germany had a ‘returnist’ 
approach in which labour migrants were guest-workers (gastarbeiter) expected to 
return to their country of origin (Meer and Modood, 2012). In the UK, in contrast, 
under the remit of several Race Relations Acts which approached equal opportunity 
as equal access, the state sought to proactively integrate minorities into the labour 
market and other key spheres of British society (e.g., education, health and political 
participation).  
Indeed, it is now over 40 years since the introduction of a third Race Relations Act 
(1976) cemented a state sponsorship of race equality by consolidating earlier, weaker 
legislative instruments (RRA 1965, 1968). Alongside a remit spanning public and 
private institutions, recognition of indirect discrimination and the imposition of a 
statutory public duty to promote good ‘race relations’, it also created the Commission 
for Racial Equality (CRE) to assist individual complainants and monitor the 
implementation of the Act. Such developments too reflected ongoing community 
based anti-racist struggles. There are many example but perhaps one that stands out 
is the Lawrence family campaign into the improper investigation of the racist murder 
of Stephen Lawrence, and attendant findings of institutional police racism 
(MacPherson, 1999). Some scope for redress therefore, against racially structured 
barriers to participation, represents one characteristic in the British approach to 
citizenship, and serves as the cornerstone of an unwritten ‘British multiculturalism’ 
(Meer, Mouritsen, Faas and De Witte, 2015).  Another way of putting this is to say 
that the public function of antidiscrimination policy has been integral in cultivating a 
‘web of beliefs’ that characterise certain political traditions (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2003), and from which several things have flowed: pluralised national identities are 
possibly the most obvious (Uberoi and Modood, 2013).  It is essential therefore to 
understand that race equality in the UK has always had a discursive character that 
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goes beyond public policy and administration, not least because it tips into debates 
about identity, belonging and community formation (Meer, 2015).   
Since the referendum result however, both governmental and non-governmental 
organisations have recorded a spike in racially motivated activity (National Police 
Chiefs Council, 2016; Institute for Race Relations, 2016). Official police figures 
report a 49% rise in incidents to 1,863 in the last week in July 2016 when compared 
with the previous year (the following week saw a record 58% increase to 17,870). 
Some of these incidents have been documented in real time and shared via social 
media, illustrating how racialized antipathy toward BAME groups, as well as white 
Europeans, often invokes rhetoric on national identity and belonging.   
 
Commentators and researchers have rightly moved to consider whether this pattern 
of activity may be isolated to the referendum, or if it forms part of a wider trajectory 
with underlying dynamics that the referendum amplified (Young, 2016; Devine, 
2016). This is necessary and valuable work, but what remains overlooked is the 
prospective status of race equality apparatus as a matter of public policy.  Since we 
are only just coming to terms with the overwhelming ‘archipelago of contradictions’ 
(Shaw, 2016: 104) raised by Brexit, this oversight is one amongst many.  
Archipelagos of course can be found isolated in large amounts of water or 
neighboring a large land mass.  Borrowing from Shaw we might figuratively use the 
designation to grasp some of the policy challenges and possible contradictions of the 
UK as a ‘Brexit Archipelago’. In this landscape it is paramount not to lose sight of the 
fact that race equality in the UK is a question of public administration, and civil and 
criminal law, as much as it is a matter of public discourse and everyday attitudes. A 
key task therefore to consider what this race equality will look like in Brexit Britain.  
 
Outline and methodology 
To this end the article proceeds in three stages. The first sets out the conceptual 
relationship between the policy process and multi-level governance, and how 
developments in race equality might be understood through these frames. The 
second stage tries to divide race equality legislation into three types that function 
across multiple policy levels: (a) that which was created in the UK, (b) that which 
flows from membership of the European Union, and (c) that which is an outgrowth 
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of the two.  These concerns have been explored through a mixed method case study 
analysis. Most closely associated with the work of the Chicago School, case study 
research has been marked by periods of intense use and disuse throughout modern 
social science inquiry (cf Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg, 1991). Its under-use is somewhat 
surprising given it is very hospitable to ‘how’, ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions.  The 
multiple sources of evidence used in this article are derived from projects with a 
common concern with race equality at EU, UK and Scottish levels, and accord with 
those found in Yin’s (1994) typology of (i) policy documents and government bills, 
(ii) archival records, and (iii) semi-structured interviews. The latter includes 
interview data with stakeholders involved in EU and UK equalities legislation, 
utilised to address gaps in the public policy literature. This data is derived from 
research supported by the European Commissioni, the Economic and Social 
Research Councilii and the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE)iii.   Cumulatively over 
60 interviews were available 15 are directly and indirectly used here, in order to 
address gaps in the policy literature.  The third stage of the article considers the 
prospective options in light of Brexit, and the discussion in stages one and two.  This 
shows how during its membership of the EU Britain has typically pioneered race 
equality legislation. This means that the status of existing settlements is subject to 
their own dynamics too, in a way that should not be attributed to Brexit alone. 
 
Part 1: The Policy Process and Multi-Level Governance  
 
To the extent that there is a prevailing account of what the study of policy process 
should incorporate, we might say this seeks to explore a series of distinct but 
interrelated ‘stages’ (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). While the precise configuration and 
description of these tend to reflect the wider theoretical stance that is adopted, they 
typically comprise: problem identification, agenda setting, consideration of potential 
actions, implementation of agreed action, and evaluation.  When linked together this 
is what is deemed to comprise a ‘policy cycle’ (Goodin, Rein and Moran, 2006). 
Somewhat deontological, these frames are best when read as non-linear ideal types, 
but which nonetheless envelope a significant breadth and depth in approaches to 
policy analysis (cf Smith & Kattikireddi, 2013).  What is worth registering are the 
ways it is increasingly common to see the use of ‘synthetic approaches’ (Ayer and 
Marsh, 2013: 645) that employ these stages to bridge across a number of theoretical 
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approaches.  Recognising that policymaking is a complicated and dynamic process, it 
is difficult at the outset to employ ‘one model’ that spans path dependencies and flux, 
agents and coalitions.  It is easier to state that most policy process literature has been 
less interested in charting the mechanics of the policy cycle across multiple levels. 
Perhaps this is due to a prevailing tendency of methodological nationalism across the 
social sciences, something which can fix our aperture at state levels.  One of the 
arguments of this article is that if we are to grasp the fate of race equality policy in 
light of Brexit, we need to bring in some of the literatures better suited to 
understanding policy making and remaking between the UK and EU.  For despite 
what is claimed by Brexiteers, the EU has never been a ‘blueprint for a workable 
system of government’ (Marks and Hooghe, 2004: 17), but instead reflects ‘an 
increasingly complex pattern of policy-making’ between member states.  To provide a 
set of conceptual linkages across the policy process and the EU therefore, in order to 
understand the prospective status of race equality post-Brexit, it would be useful to 
turn to some of the literatures on multi-level governance (hereafter MLG).  
This is not a simple task.  The literatures on MLG are wide-ranging and reflect 
competing traditions of thought. To avoid getting entrenched in important but 
lengthy debates, and in the tradition of Wittgenstein, the article approaches the 
meaning of concepts as something derived from their use.  This is not the same as 
ignoring the provenance of concepts; being sensitive to this is important in 
understanding how such meanings have come to be been forged.  Bache and Flinders 
(2004: 2-3) for example trace MLG to ‘a new wave of thinking about the EU as a 
political system rather than [as] a process of integration…that followed swiftly from 
the accelerated deepening of the integration process in the mid to late 1980s’. The 
concept therefore closely tracks the dynamic formation of EU and attendant political 
settlements. This is a view supported by Awesti (2007: 3) for whom MLG emerged ‘as 
a response to the state-centric, intergovernmentalist theory of the EU which 
dominated studies throughout the so-called period of ‘eurosclerosis’iv from the late 
1960s.’  Jordan (2001: 196) perhaps put it most succinctly when he characterised 
MLG is part of an intellectual effort ‘to investigate the various parts rather than the 
whole of the EU’.   
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The ‘parts’ here describe a variety of actors in the policy process across public, 
private and civil society but in ways that are not limited to state boundaries.  Here 
governance is as important as multiple levels, specifically in the view that European 
societies have grown so complex, dynamic and differentiated that no single policy 
approach commands hierarchical control (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012).  An 
understanding of governance thus needs to grasp the role of networks that blur 
boundaries between state and civil society, and which rely on organisations and 
NGOs at various levels of consultation and partnership (O’Toole and Meer et al., 
2015).  If we take the European Commission Code of conduct on the partnership 
principle for Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 (European Commission 2012: 3), both 
features are included and framed in the following terms: ‘Multi-level governance 
means coordinated action by the European Union, the Member States and local and 
regional authorities, based on partnership and aimed at drawing up and 
implementing EU policies’. The challenge for policy analysis then is not only to ‘grasp 
the dynamics of scale’ (Davies, 2013: 497) but, given the complexity of the policy 
process, to consider why some approaches are successful in this environment and 
others are not.    
 
This question is integral to understanding the EU Race Equality Directive (RED) that 
emerged from the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and which came into force in 2000.  
As elaborated below, the answer partly relies on the idea of ‘policy windows’, 
informed by Kingdon’s (1984) view that an opportunity for policy change opens when 
a number of ‘streams’ coalesce. In the case of the RED directive, and perhaps 
reflecting what McGoey (2012) understood as the strategic role of ignorance, the ‘EU 
was proceeding from a low base in this area’ (Geddes and Guiraudon, 2007: 127) in a 
manner that undoubtedly elevated UK expertise 
It is worth registering that the EU’s legal competences in the social policy field across 
the board are otherwise quite minimal, and in this respect RED is unusual. What 
made the incorporation of RED easier were at least two conditions for ‘uploading’. 
Namely, that British approaches were actively taken up by EC policy makers, and 
RED amounted to ‘a relatively costless measure that mapped well with an already 
existing national framework’ established in the UK practice on race equality (Geddes 
and Guiraudon, 2007: 129). In order to discuss and address the policy analysis 
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challenge I set out earlier, we first need to understand the constituent features of UK 
and EU race equality policy. This is presented in part two below.  Before we move to 
this, and in an effort to caution against seeing policy processes as unidirectional, it’s 
important to register that what came back from the EU following this ‘uploading’ was 
coterminous with decade of policy ferment in UK anti-discrimination, something 
that led to novel outcomes because it tried to address the intersecting nature of 
inequalities.   
One of the specific characteristics of this policy ferment, discussed below, is that it 
was fostered by a broadly conceived intersectional approach, of the kind ultimately 
enshrined within The Equality Act 2010. This Act was variously deemed ‘a major 
landmark in the long struggle for equal rights’ (Hepple, 2011), and considered to be 
an advance on other paths to domesticating European legislation elsewhere in the 
EU (O’Brien, 2013). Precisely how much of this is a debt owed to MLG policy 
processes?   
 
Part 2: Something old, something new, something borrowed… 
 
Let’s begin with legislation.  The first thing to say is that it is a curious feature of 
British citizenship that its possession has never conferred a formal right to non-
discrimination, not least because the UK has no ‘written’ constitution as found in 
many liberal democracies. What has been amassed instead is a body of legislation 
that is overseen by the judiciary and intermediate organisations, and which protects 
both citizens and non-citizens from discrimination on specific ‘grounds’.  As I outline 
below we might divide this legislation into three kinds:  
 
(a) That which was created in the UK 
(b) That which flows from membership of the European Union 
(c) That which is a combination between the two 
 
The key question is to what extent withdrawal from the EU revises a, b, or c? This is 
elaborated by examining the interaction of specific British approaches and generic 
EC directives. The article then considers what broader approaches these directives 
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may be tied to politically, as well as legally, with respect to human rights discourses, 
the creation of Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the overarching 
Equalities Act 2010. Let’s begin with (a). 
 
(a) Endogenous Equalities 
 
Perhaps some of the most powerful anti-discrimination instruments enacted in 
Britain can be found in the statutory torts of unlawful discrimination found in both 
the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act and the 1976 Race Relations Act, which prohibit 
direct and indirect forms of discrimination, and impose statutory duties of care.  For 
example, section 1(1)(b) of the 1976 Race Relations Act (RRA) is modelled on the 
1975 Sex Discrimination Act, which results, on the one hand, from a practical 
concern to enact tested legislation and, on the other, a shrewd political manoeuvre by 
the then Home Secretary (Merlyn Rees) to find cross party support for race relations 
legislation from a variety of quarters, precisely because they had already supported 
sex discrimination legislation 
 
Section 71(1) of the 1976 RRA (as amended primarily in 2000 and 2003), in 
particular, required all public authorities to adopt a general duty to promote race 
equality, sought to eliminate racial discrimination, ensure equality of opportunity 
and promote good ‘race relations’ (through such things as outreach work and 
diversity awareness training). There are also specific duties enabled by the 
legislation, such as the implementation of a written policy on race equality, perhaps 
as part of an overall policy; an assessment of the impact of new and current policies 
on minority ethnic staff, students and other service users; the monitoring of 
recruitment and progression of minority ethnic staff and students; and the 
monitoring of grievance, disciplinary, appraisal, staff development and termination 
procedures by ethnicity. The Secretary of State is also empowered to impose specific 
duties on key, listed public authorities. Broadly, these selected authorities must 
publish a Race Equalities Scheme and meet specific employment duties (the scheme 
is effectively a strategy and action plan).  
 
It is notable that these measures have developed in a way that places a specific 
emphasis on managing group relations. In doing so, Britain has perhaps borrowed 
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something from an American approach to tackling racism. If this is so, then it has 
also gone further in focusing on how society can achieve fair treatment for different 
groups, something that reaches beyond how these groups might blend into society. 
This means that British antidiscrimination frameworks tried to ‘address the rights of 
distinct groups as well as their modes of interaction, and so are not merely concerned 
with the rights of individuals’ (Rudiger, 2007: 46).  
 
This comprises a significant body of legislation that applies to all ethnic and racial 
minority groups categorised according to race, colour, nationality (including 
citizenship) or ethnic or national origins. To illustrate how different it was to the 
approaches of EU neighbours we might register its dynamic quality.  For example, 
some religious minority groups, especially Sikhsv and Jewsvi, have in case law 
cumulatively established precedents in the application of this legislation to protect 
them, though in a way that has not been extended to all religious minority groups 
(Meer, 2015). What is nonetheless important to note is that while ethnic and racial 
categories vary across the EU, a stand out feature that according to Simon (2005: 14) 
has been taken up is the idea of indirect discrimination. This is something most fully 
pioneered in UK approaches, and characterised as ‘a source of one of the key trends 
in matters of non-discrimination and promotion of equality’ (ibid.). It is to this that 
we now turn. 
 
(b) European Equalities 
 
European Commission (EC) directives derived from Article 13 of the 1999 Treaty of 
Amsterdam came into force in the first part of the millennium. Under a Labour 
government these directives were coterminous with important changes in established 
legal responses to racial and religious anti-discrimination measures in Britain.  Prior 
to this, across the EU there had been no consistent level of protection against racial 
discrimination (and little legislation that has consistently protected people from 
discrimination that takes place on grounds of religion, disability, age or sexual 
orientationvii). In recognition of this, the EC introduced the following Article:  
 
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the 
powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a 
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proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may 
take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. (Office Journal of 
European Communities C325/33: 11 and Council Directive 2000/78/EC) 
 
This Article was enacted through the issuing of two directives. By 2014 it was 
reported that both directives had ‘been transposed into national laws in all 28 
Member States and the conformity of all those laws with the Directives had been 
[satisfactorily] checked by the Commission (EC, 2014).  The important point for the 
purposes of our discussion is that it also meant that ‘in effect, the British framework 
has been “uploaded” to EU level’ (Geddes and Guiraudon, 2008: 129). What this 
claim doesn’t sufficiently answer is why? An interesting account here might be 
garnered from Kohler-Koch (1996: 362-3), and concerns the logic behind other 
examples of ‘uploading’ to the EU level, and specifically about shifting policy 
problems from the national to the European agenda to avoid public pressure. In his 
words: 
 
[M]ember states themselves…[have] considered joint problem-solving to be more 
attractive than preserving their national autonomy. As a consequence, governments 
may accept a further transfer of authority to the [European] Community to increase, 
at least indirectly, their problem-solving capacity (ibid). 
 
There is a clear rational choice reading at work here in so far as policy problem 
solving is characterised as mutually beneficial, but first and foremost in the obvious 
self-interest of national governments.  It is worth problematizing this by registering 
the role of coalitions and lobbying too.  Geddes and Guiraudon (2007: 134), for 
example, persuasively show that while ‘NGOs played no role in the negotiation of the 
directive and were not at the negotiating table… the kinds of ideas mobilised by the 
SLG [Staring Line Group] were present and did have influence on the legislation 
because they had been fed into the Commission policy’. The Anglo-Dutch-led 
Starting Line Group (SLG) was a network of more than 250 NGOs, and which 
actively sought the inclusion of antidiscrimination articles within the Amsterdam 
Treaty (Amiya-Nakada, 2007).  Carles (2008) too points to ‘results from a social 
mobilisation process and from policies elaborated at international and European 
level’ by civil society actors. In this respect it could be argued that in these policy 
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developments certain ‘policy coalitions’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) were 
operative. For example, a strong coalition of stakeholders and advocates across 
equality strands was successful in ensuring neither that a unification of equalities 
legislation should risk neither regression nor levelling downward. Geddes and 
Guiraudon (2007: 126) put it as follows:  
 
The ways in which these acquired some purchase at EU level and were then broadly 
reflected in the resultant legislation…tells us quite a lot about the constitution of the 
EU as a political field and the kinds of political and social capital that are privileged 
within it.   
 
The implication being that the EU had spaces which ‘tended to privilege networks of 
expertise’ (ibid. 131) which propelled not only the British but also some variation of 
the Dutch model, both of which are ‘linked to a network of actors including NGOs 
and academic activists with good links to European institutions, particularly the 
Commission and the Parliament’ (Geddes and Guiraudon, 2008: 133). Perhaps the 
key point here is that scholarship on multi-level governance has tended to be taken 
up in ways that emphasise the ‘multi-level’, but underappreciate the ‘governance’ 
feature of the relationship.  Or perhaps more precisely, to think of governance in 
terms of the distribution or diffusion of ‘governing’ arrangements, rather than the 
ways policy making processes are subject to governance dynamics too. This is not 
necessarily a floor in the design of the concept, but an observation on the limited 
ways in which it has been used to think about the alternating and diffuse means 
through which policy can be made.   For although never present at actual negotiating 
tables, the involvement of the SLG illustrates the way in which tested practices from 
British and Dutch contexts could be marshalled and mobilised to influence ‘the 
content of legislation because they had been fed into the Commission policy 
development process’ (Geddes and Guiraudon, 2008: 133). One participant in the 
process, an expert in discrimination law who monitored the impact of the directive, 
provides an interesting contextual insight: 
 
[T]he Race Directive was approved in Europe very quickly – this was when Haider 
had been elected in Austria and there were too many racist incidents across Europe 
so no member state would want to be seen to be voting against an anti-racism 
measure. For the next directive there was much more politicking going on. The 
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Catholic Church used its influence so protection for religious organisations is 
particularly good. (Interview with author) 
 
The RED required member states to make discrimination on grounds of racial or 
ethnic origin unlawful in employment and training. Unlike the Employment 
Directive, it went further in requiring member states to provide protection against 
discrimination in non-employment areas, such as education, access to social welfare, 
and the provision of goods and services. In many respects mirroring the approach of 
the RRA in promoting proactive initiatives in combating discrimination in member 
states. RED required member states to establish bodies as an institutional support 
for equal treatment provisions, but it is arguable whether it endorsed proactive 
measures to promote equality within institutions. For example, the positive action 
clause in the directives, which was phrased as an exception rather than as an explicit 
means to achieve equal treatment, ‘offers an insufficient basis for such an approach 
[because] the Directives remain focused upon individual litigation against specific 
acts of discrimination once they have occurred’ (Rudiger, 2007: 49).  
 
This raises the question as to what contribution these directives could make where 
they did not increase the levels of protection that were already available in Britain. 
According to a British MEP closely involved in scrutinising the legislation: 
 
[T]he Race Equality Directive was not a huge advance because we already had a fairly 
comprehensive Race Relations Act. But it did improve it in the area of burden of proof 
and it also showed the UK that this was the right way to go and stopped any kind of 
regression or going backwards in terms of race equality legislation. The key areas which 
are still to be fully developed in the UK are disability and age, and in both these areas 
the Employment Directive has been helpful in pushing the UK further than we were 
going, as well as religion of course (Interview with author). 
 
In this respect the impact was mainly political in shoring up a particular approach. In 
practical terms it moved the burden of proof away from the claimant onto the 
organisation or party against whom a charge of discrimination is made. Both these 
reasons were cited as assets by UK Race Equality Network (2016) during the EU 
referendum.  
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The fact that the UK has to comply with this directive was an important reason why 
the current government could not and did not attempt to weaken our race 
discrimination laws when it was considering how to implement the Red Tape 
Challenge and cut down on laws and regulations that affect business.  Additionally, it 
is important that UK nationals regardless of race are protected when they work in 
other member states (UK REN, 2016). 
 
Despite marking an advance on what had gone before in a number of EU countries, 
other weaknesses of the Race Equality Directive quickly became apparent.  One was 
that it stopped short of requiring substantive positive action, another is that is relied 
on legal complaints rather than effective proactive rule-making within organisations. 
As Hand (2008: 599) observed, the directive did not ‘expressly permit the adoption 
of “measures providing specific advantages” but merely the adoption of “specific 
measures”’.  Perhaps a more nebulous criticism is that while at an EU level it advised 
a dialogue on racism, it did not monitor this or propose an EU wide response to it.  In 
many respects then although the RED marked an advance elsewhere in Europe, it 
was not of its own accord an advance in the UK.  A better way to see it is as a catalyst, 
especially when coupled to the impact of a human rights agenda, something to which 
we turn next.   
 
(c) Catalysts for change?  
 
The late John Urry (2004: 5) once noted that ‘relationships between variables can be 
non-linear with abrupt switches occurring, so the same ‘cause’ can, in specific 
circumstances, produce different effects.’  Perhaps this is one way to think about our 
third types of equalities legislation. An example of type (c) is the 1998 Human Rights 
Act, which brought into domestic law key provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).  One of the contributors to the legislation put it as follows:  
 
The way to understand the introduction of the Human Rights Act is in the context of 
a debate about the Bill of Rights rather than as specifically about equality and 
discrimination although that was certainly part of it. […] However, it’s not 
particularly helpful at dealing with all the details of discrimination in everyday life, 
which is why you also need specific equalities legislation … for example, the Human 
Rights Act cannot be used directly against private bodies, although all law must 
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comply with it, while specific discrimination legislation directly impacts on the 
private sphere. (Interview with author) 
 
The aforementioned Bill of Rights is an unsettled topic that is expected to return to 
the Brexit archipelago. What form this might take is unclear, but the Bill of Rights 
Commission (2012) under the Coalition Government (2010-2015) actually sought to 
build on the European Convention of Human Rights (EHRC).  It was also notable 
that the difference between a concern with rights and equality quickly became 
apparent in the way that the Human Rights Act promotes a more individualistic 
approach.  Since it considers the majority of people in need of protection from some 
form of discrimination, it perhaps risks de-emphasising specific experiences of 
historically disadvantaged minority groups. The implication for prospective policy 
making in this area is that uniform rights for individual citizens could take 
precedence over recognising the situation of diverse and disadvantaged groups in 
society.  
 
This might facilitate a shift from a group-based approach to a focus on individual 
rights. While such a move might assist the principled operation of human rights 
legislation in promoting, for example, the right to religious freedom, it may be less 
sensitive to promoting specific anti-discrimination measures. So while something 
modelled on a Human Rights approach could protect the right to practise religion in 
accordance with religious beliefs, as is exemplified by provisions including Article 9 
of the ECHR, it is different to how anti-discrimination measures would be concerned 
with how discrimination against religious minority groups picks out individuals on 
the basis of discernible characteristics, and attributes to them an alleged group 
tendency, or emphasises those features that are used to stigmatise or that reflect 
pejorative or negative assumptions based on the individual’s real or perceived 
membership of that group.   
 
This raises the question, then, as to whether an increasing focus on the former risks 
ignoring how different minority groups are disadvantaged in different ways, and 
moves the emphasis away from a more specific recognition of diversity. Rudiger 
(2007: 52) argued that this was observable at the EU policy-making level where a 
new focus on human rights informed the change from the European Centre on 
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Monitoring Racism and Xenophobia into the Fundamental Rights Agency. It is to 
these issues that we now turn through examples of recent changes to longstanding 
British approaches that have historically recognised diversity in their promotion of 
equality. 
According to one respondent, it was widely understood that ‘another review of 
discrimination law was unlikely to happen again for a long while’ and that this 
presented the opportunity ‘as a bare minimum to harmonise some quite disparate 
pieces of legislation’ (interview). There is a convoluted history as to what this review 
initiated: before the 2010 Act, the Equality Bill (released in May 2008 and sent for 
consultation in July) combined all UK equality enactments so as to provide 
comparable protections across each equality ground. The Bill itself relied on the 
legislative framework of prior UK legislation, with amendments, found in the Sex 
Discrimination Act (1975), Race Relations Act (1976) and Disability Discrimination 
Act (1995).  Those explicitly mentioned in the previous 2006 Equality Act (which 
created the EHRC) included age; disability; gender; proposed, commenced or 
completed gender reassignment; race; religion or belief; and sexual orientation. This 
Act was presented as a blend of traditional non-discrimination obligations, 
substantive equality goals around equal participation, and statutory duties to 
promote respect for diversity, human dignity and human rights. It was particularly 
noteworthy because it was the first occasion on which equality and diversity were 
expressly tied together (See especially s.8(1) and (2) of the 2006 Equality Act). 
The QC and legal scholar Bob Hepple (2010) pointed to four key milestones in the 
resulting 2010 Act.  These included (i) an integrated perspective of equality law that 
is promoted by a harmonized (single) Equality body, namely the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (EHRC); (ii) consistency in definitions of discrimination, 
harassment and victimization across different ‘grounds’ i.e., identity categories of 
age, sex, ethnicity, religion, disability, sexuality and human rights; (iii) the extension 
of ‘positive duties’ which proactively promoted equality in public authorities across 
all characteristics (initially including socio-economic inequality); and (iv) expanding 
the application of how ‘positive action’ is practiced (not to be confused with ‘positive 
discrimination’).  In his view therefore it is a ‘transformative Act’ (Hepple, 2014: 1).  
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Despite all of this, it is striking that in the final 2010 Equality Act there is only a 
partial commitment to intersectionality in so far as principle 12 allows multiple 
discrimination but only on two grounds, each of which have to be claims of direct 
discrimination (rather than harassment or indirect discrimination).  According to 
Hepple (2010: 16) this reflected a concession to the business lobby ‘who opposed any 
provision on multiple discrimination’ on the ground that it would become “unduly 
burdensome” to business’. 
 
Part 3: The mischief of faction? 
 
In the previous two sections we have discussed the challenges of how to understand 
the prospective status of UK race equality in the context of Brexit.  To do this the 
article has turned to MLG literatures, and then distinguished between the 
provenance of different legal and policy materials that make up the patchwork of 
existing UK race equality policy.  The conceptual task is to connect the policy change 
literatures to the MLG literatures. It is clear that an adequate understanding of 
public policy developments in this area must incorporate an understanding of the 
multiple-levels across which race equality in the UK has been forged. Some of this is 
augmented by an understanding the ways in which ‘advocacy coalitions’ proved 
effective in propelling some change over others (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).  
Some of it has reflected an EU level ‘window’ thrown open by a specific ‘policy 
constellation’ that formed part of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Rudiger, 2007: 41). It 
has been argued that while multi-level governance has tended to be taken up in ways 
that emphasise the ‘multi-level’, it has underappreciated the ‘governance’ feature of 
the relationship, especially the ways policy making process is subject to governance 
dynamics too. The unanticipated consequences of this have certainly been profound 
because they proved a catalyst for changes to existing approaches to race equality in 
the UK, especially by tying together a number of different grounds in addition to race 
i.e., driving home an intersectional agenda through the 2010 Equalities Act and the 
creation of a single Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC).   
 
In this respect MLG literatures are useful in helping to gauge the character of these 
developments, and especially reading off their dynamic and multi-directional flow 
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e.g., not just from the UK to the EU but vice versa.  There is also further possible 
explanatory currency in taking seriously the MLG assumption that ‘adaptation to EC 
institutions and policies drastically increases the cost of exit from existing 
arrangements for member states’ (Pierson, 1996: 144-145).  With this in mind it is 
difficult – although not impossible - to imagine that a post-Brexit administration 
would actively unpick the domestication of the equality components of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1999), especially since the UK was already compliant with race equality 
provisions.  In other words, the Equality Act (2010) is not merely about being 
compliant with EU directives, but reflects an endogenous trajectory in incorporating 
the existing race equality provisions discussed in part two.  This means that the ‘sunk 
costs’, as Awesti (2007: 17) calls them, and which extend to wider patterns of societal 
level adaptation, are likely to be sufficiently ‘sticky’ regardless of the ‘current 
preferences of political leaders’ (ibid) – or what James Maddison memorably termed 
the ‘mischief of faction’.  
 
This should most certainly not be taken to imply that Brexit will not diminish race 
equality in the UK.  The myriad of Brexit uncertainties are such that they might be 
modelled through a Johari window model (e.g., that which is known to be known and 
that which is known to be unknown, etc) (Luft, 1969).  In terms of the politics, if the 
‘policy image’ (Jones, 1994) of race equality comes to be associated with an EU 
imposition, rather than an endogenous creation, it becomes much more contested by 
those seeking to uncouple as much as they can from the EU.  Put in other terms, if 
race equality becomes part of the ‘collateral rhetoric’ (O’Brien, 2013: 490) of Brexit, 
rather than a longstanding – though unsettled and incomplete – British 
conversation, then the symbolic politics of this would do great harm.  Equally, in the 
area of trade agreements, there may well be economic incentives to reduce equality 
protections that would bear either a direct or indirect discriminatory outcome for 
BAME groups.  This is all speculative of course, but there are obvious conditions 
which might cultivate such a move.  Mulder (2016) offers the following scenario 
concerning gender equality in particular but the lesson is salutary and registers with 
race too: 
 
[I]t is not difficult to see how a UK government facing turbulent economic times and 
having put UK businesses in the position of having to compete with the rest of the 
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world outside of a trading block, would feel like there is little choice other than to 
reduce the level of protection and return to the ineffective and formalistic legal 
framework … 
 
Trading off race equality in the name of efficiency and competitiveness is therefore a 
very real concern, but to some extent such a scenario would mark an accelerated roll 
back on commitments already bear a precarious status.  For example, the Coalition 
Government (2010-15) significantly undermined features of the of the Equality Act in 
the name of deregulation and competitiveness, summarised in O’Brien’s (2013: 486) 
complaint, that ‘innovations in the structure of equality law forged by a generation’s 
experience of its application are in danger of being brushed aside with scarcely a 
political murmur’.  The point being that UK governments already have the capacity 
to roll back from race equality commitments, and have shown the political will to do 
so, independent of other developments. 
 
The Equality Act 2010 was possibly the final piece of substantive legislation 
introduced by the Labour government (1997-2010), and the Conservative-Liberal 
Coalition inherited it before the legislation had bedded in, and so were charged 
immediately with delivering it. Perhaps illustrating a direction of travel, while then 
Home Secretary, now Prime Minister May, announced a review of the public sector 
equality duty in the government’s ‘red tape reduction challenge’. The report of the 
Independent Steering Group on the Public Sector Duty struck an ominous tone, 
especially their description of ‘useless bureaucratic practices which do nothing for 
equality’, concluding that ‘Equality is too important to be tied up in red tape. Let’s 
cut it out’ (Government Equalities Office, 2013: 7).  As O’Brien (2013: 486) notes, the 
review itself offered a ‘reminder of the need for constant vigilance if hard one 
institutional gains are not to be squandered’.  A reminder too, if needed, of the 
capacity of UK governments to set an agenda of regression on race equality 
commitments within the existing parameters of multi-level governance 
arrangements.   
 
There may however be other possibilities too.  For example, even though Equalities 
are broadly reserved to the UK Parliament, a certain kind of drift in MLG has meant 
that Scotland is simultaneously the same and different. Schedule 5 of the Scotland 
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Act 1998 (c46) basically incorporated the functions of the third Race-Relations Act 
(1976). In May 2012 however, the Scottish government placed specific duties on 
public authorities, also known as the Scottish Specific Duties, requiring a listed 
authority to publish a mainstreaming report on the progress it has made in 
integrating the three needs of the General Equality Duty (GED) to: (i) Eliminate 
unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimization; (ii) Advance equality of 
opportunity, and (iii) Foster good relations. This was followed in 2016 with a new 
Race Equality Framework which marked a further contrast with the discontinuation 
of statutory equality impact assessments in England, and possibly marks a 
divergence from understanding race equality instruments as an administrative 
burden. 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the consultation on harmonising different equality bodies and different 
equality legislation, a concern that was repeatedly voiced drew attention to the risk of 
rolling back previous race equality achievements through other means. In particular, 
there was a fear that in reshaping the sector so radically, and even if there was no 
immediate ‘dilution’ and settlements were ‘levelled up’ across different grounds, 
when a distinct race equality commission was no longer able to publically agitate for 
race equality, and when legislation became streamlined, a less favourable political 
administration in more cash-strapped times would encounter less resistance if they 
moved to undermine existing settlements. In their study Craig and O’Neil (2013) 
showed precisely these developments. They noted, for example, that budget of the 
harmonised EHRC was reduced by the coalition administration to the equivalent of 
less than one of its constituent bodies (from £70m when it started in 2007 to £17m 
presently).  They also highlighted how statutory equality impact assessments have 
been discontinued.  In addition, Ware (2013: 8) notes how the single Equality Act 
had the effect of diluting to communities themselves.   
 
In the best traditions of race-equality however, the response to these developments 
needs to stem from an anti-racism that mobilises and agitates across a range of 
sectors, taking in the arts and education in addition to political and policy arenas. 
This reading is consistent with a longstanding view that anti-racism is an unsettled, 
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incomplete and on-going pursuit (Gilborn, 2007).  The theme running throughout 
this article is that during its membership of the EU, Britain has typically pioneered 
race equality legislation. This means that the status of existing settlements is subject 
to their own dynamics too, in a way that should not be attributed to Brexit alone. 
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